In the Light of the Law

Saturday, May 10, 2008

Staunching the wound of Bleeding Kansas

A century and a half ago, "Bleeding Kansas" referred to the violence through which Kansans suffered as a presage to the full-scale war that engulfed the United States just a few years later. Today, "Bleeding Kansas" more aptly describes that beautiful state's reputation as a haven for late-term abortions.

The governor of Kansas, Kathleen Sebelius, firmly aligned with the abortion lobby, just vetoed the Kansas Comprehensive Abortion Reform Act, meaning that Jayhawk abortion profiteers need not so much as mention to women, specifically mothers, that alternatives exist to the violence they are about to undergo. May the governor pay the price for that incomprehensible veto (however small that price compares to what a single baby pays for it) at the polls.

In the meantime, though, Gov. Sebelius is also a personally-opposed-to-abortion-but-yaddah-yaddah-yaddah Catholic. Unlike many other personally-opposed-to-abortion-but-yaddah-yaddah-yaddah Catholics, however, Gov. Sebelius falls under the jurisdiction of a bishop who cares (as would any bishop) about the abortion havoc being wrought on his people and about the state of the souls of those who foment that carnage, but also of a bishop who will act (as do too few bishops), publicly, prudently, but firmly in response to the care.

Kansas City (KS) Abp. Joseph Naumann has met with Gov. Sebelius many times to dissuade her from machinating against the preborn; failing to move her, and after consulting his suffragans, he wrote to her in August 2007 "requesting that she refrain from presenting herself for reception of the Eucharist until she had acknowledged the error of her past positions, made a worthy sacramental confession and taken the necessary steps for amendment of her life which would include a public repudiation of her previous efforts and actions in support of laws and policies sanctioning abortion."

Abp. Naumann's statement is model of pastoral sollicitude and political savoir faire. I think it required reading for any one who wishes to discuss this topic seriously, along with, say, Abp. Raymond Burke's "Canon 915: The discipline regarding denial of holy Communion to those obstinately perservering in manifest grave sin", Periodica 96 (2007) 3-58, and my own "Denial of the Eucharist to pro-abortion Catholic politicans: a canonical case study", Homiletic & Pastoral Review (Oct. 1990) 28-32, 48-49.

Now, however, confronted with evidence that Gov. Sebelius has ignored his request, Abp. Naumann has privately and publically called upon the governor to desist from receiving Holy Communion, reiterating his desire that the governor accept his "previous request and not require from [him] any additional pastoral actions." Hmmm. Additional pastoral actions.

Abp. Naumann has applied Canon 915 as a tourniquet to staunch the wound that Gov. Sebelius has inflicted on the Mystical Body of Christ. But Canon 915 is only designed to keep a bad situation from getting worse; what is ultimately necessary here is repentance by a prominent Catholic of her grave pro-abortion activities. In the meantime, if Canon 915 doesn't stop the bleeding, the archbishop's only alternative would be surgery under Book Six of the Code of Canon Law, "Sanctions in the Church."

And no one should want that. +++

Additional blog commentary: Fr. John Zuhlsdorf, AmericanPapist,

Tuesday, May 06, 2008

I like this: Abps. Myers and Burke to pontifical councils

The Vatican Information Service (VISnews 080506) announced today that Benedict XVI just appointed several new members to the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, the Roman dicastery that, under 1983 CIC 16 and Pastor Bonus 154-158, provides binding interpretations of ecclesiastical law. The PCLT is a very important office for canonistics; in some repects, it is more important than the Roman Rota (long explanation omitted). Papal appointments to the PCLT are worth watching.

Granted that some prelates are named to the PCLT because, well, they couldn't not be appointed given their importance in other Roman curial offices, among the 'personal' appointments announced today, two American archbishops standout: John Myers of Newark and Raymond Burke of Saint Louis. Abp. Myers, an expert in property law, has been serving as a consultor to the PCLT for over 10 years; Abp. Burke, an expert in procedures and penal law, and who was also appointed to the influential Congregation for the Clergy, has considerable experience in the Signatura. Both appointments are very good news for clear thinkers.

Last November, I dismissed theories that the USCCB election for the head of its Canonical Affairs committee was in any way a referendum on the firm approach adopted by Abp. Burke in regard to pro-abortion Catholic politicians. Folks who tried to parlay the bishops' choice of the excellent Chicago auxiliary Bp. Paprocki into an endorsement of a 'kinder, gentler' approach to ecclesiastical law should be glad I did: Else, how will they account, without blushing, for Rome's naming of Abp. Burke to two posts wherein his approach to canon law is going to get a serious hearing at the highest levels?

If one will permit me a bit of button busting, I'm thrilled that three prelates who graciously wrote forwards to my various books (Myers for Annulments and the Catholic Church and The 1917 Code of Canon Law in English Translation, Burke for the Incrementa in Progressu 1983 Codicis Iuris Canonici, and Paprocki for Excommunication and the Catholic Church) are serving the Church's legal system in such prominent ways. Makes me wanna work harder, too.

Thursday, May 01, 2008

Autumn Kelly: making the wrong choice for the wrong reason

Barring Catholics from the throne of England, for no other reason than that they are Catholics, sounds more ominous than it is. I mean, who would want to be the king or queen of England anymore? Still religious bigotry is religious bigotry, and the ban prohibiting Catholics, or those married to Catholics, from ascending British throne, should be dropped.

In the meantime, making even less sense than desiring to be the monarch of England, is giving up one's Catholic faith so that one's future husband can stay ---what is it? --- 11th in line to succeed to that throne! But that's exactly what Catholic Autumn Kelly has done, she's joined the Church of England so that, when she marries Peter Phillips later this month, he can cling to odds of ascending even slimmer than those held by "Louis Mazzini" in the Alec Guinness comedy classic Kind Hearts and Coronets (1949)! Really, it's too, too bizzare.

But amid the surrealism, there is an important canonical issue: On 13 March 2006, a "notification" (a very problematic notification, in my opinion) as to what constitutes a "formal act of defection from the Catholic Church" was handed down by the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts. I've always thought there were problems with that interpretation, but I sure don't see how it's up to handling this case.

As public and as unambiguous as Kelly's abandonment of the Catholic Church seems to be, it is not clear that it satisfies the (extremely rarified) definition of "formal act of defection" that is supposed to guide canonical thinking these days, leaving us on the horns of a dilemma: if Kelly's abandonment of the Catholic faith is not a "formal act of defection", what besides a rank exercise in legalism keeps it from being so? Alternatively, if Kelly's act of abandonment is an act of defection, how does she meet the requirements set forth in the interpretation when presumably most others will not?

As one who thinks that law should be able meet situations encountered in real life, I'll be curious to see this problem resolved. In the meantime, besides praying that Kelly returns to the Church (we'll take back her even if she isn't the queen of England), I am left wondering how the validity of her soon-to-be-attempted marriage will fare in light of what appears to be a sure defect of form (1983 CIC 1108 vs 1117). Unless 10 people up and die, she's not going to be queen, and besides that, she's either not going to be Catholic, or not going to be validly married. What a mess.

Monday, April 28, 2008

Four cheers for New York's Cardinal Egan

Four cheers, not three.

Three for telling Rudy Giuliani, a notorious supporter of legalized abortion, that Canon 915 means what it says, that those who obstinately persist in manifest grave sin are subject to the withholding of Holy Communion. Chronic promotion of abortion, in which Rudy engages, is a grave sin. See Cdl. Ratzinger's letter of June 2004.

And an extra cheer for holding in reserve the slam-dunk norm prohibiting Rudy from committing objective sacrilege against the Eucharist, namely, the 1994 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith LETTER TO THE BISHOPS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH CONCERNING THE RECEPTION OF HOLY COMMUNION BY THE DIVORCED AND REMARRIED MEMBERS OF THE FAITHFUL, esp. para. 4: "If the divorced are remarried civilly, they find themselves in a situation that objectively contravenes God's law. Consequently, they cannot receive Holy Communion as long as this situation persists." Rudy is divorced and remarried outside the Church.

Under either heading, then, whether for pro-abortion activism or for divorce and remarriage, to say nothing of both, Rudy is barred from receiving Communion. Period. His very, very public act of defiance in taking Communion at the papal Mass deserves swift and firm condemnation.

Related post: 15 March 2007. Since when is Rudy Giuliani excommunicated?
Related article: Denial of the Eucharist to pro-abortion Catholic politicians (1990)
Read Phil Lawler's excellent analysis.

Thursday, April 24, 2008

Rome's four options in regard to Bp. Fernando Lugo

Who is not happy to see Paraguay's junta finally voted out of office? That the election was peaceful and, so far, seems to be accepted by the old guard is even better. But that is not the issue in regard to Paraguay's new president, Bp. Fernando Lugo.

The issue here is canonical (and by implication, theological and pastoral): Lugo was ordained to the fullness of holy orders for the spiritual service of God's people. By all accounts, he was doing good work in that task when, at some point (and it does not appear to have been very long ago), he saw an opportunity to substitute another good (and yes, serving the people in civil office is a good) for the one he originally accepted. The new good that Lugo is pursuing, however, civil governance, is not only incompatible with his many duties as bishop, it is flatly prohibited to clerics (c. 285.3). But Lugo took it notwithstanding.

To his credit, Lugo attempted to give up his clerical status by petitioning a return to the lay state. But, to its credit, Rome said no, observing that clerical status at the episcopal level is not something that can be surrendered. Lugo refused to stand down for election, but even then Rome did not respond with its heaviest censure, excommunication; instead, Rome suspended Lugo from ministry, leaving his status as a member of the clergy intact. For now.

The recent apology from Lugo (again he seems to be desirous of minimizing the ecclesiastical harm his actions have caused) is not yet sufficient for this problem, though a superficial reading of Canon 1347.2 might suggest otherwise: Lugo's apology amounts to "I am truly sorry that I have caused scandal by gravely violating ecclesiastical law; I will continue to violate it." That, folks, is simply not an apology. However "sincerely" it is said.

So Rome has, as I see it, four options here.

1. Excommunicate Lugo (there are a couple-three ways that could come about on these facts), and leave him in the same state as a Milingo. Except that Lugo is clearly not a Milingo.

2. Lift the penalty of suspension (in recognition of Lugo's sincere desire to avoid harming others), impose a salutary penance under Canons 1339-1340 for his actions inconsistent with Canon 285.3 (invoking if necessary c. 1399), and dismiss Lugo from the clerical state ex offico (and not as a favor that one can request).

3. Dispense Lugo from c. 285.3 (it is subject to dispensation and a case for that under cc. 85, 88, 90 can be argued here). Then live with the consequences that such a precedent (in life, not in law, per c. 16.3) will unavoidably establish for a long, long time.

4. Do nothing, and hope that Lugo will resign the presidency (yeah, right), or do nothing till his term expires and then "reconcile" him (which will send a strong message that Canon 285 is pointless), or just do nothing, period.

No one wants option # 1 (though it is on the table). I think # 2 is the prudent choice, but my guess is that Rome is looking hard at # 3, despite a chronic curialista predilection to follow # 4. As I've had occasion to say before, I'm glad it's not my call to make.

In the meantime, though, I can't help noticing that Lugo's political career is being launched by doing what politicians do best: disregarding one promise in order to make another. Too bad. He seems a better man than that. +++

Note: See also this Rite of Dismissal for a Bishop from the 1895 Roman Pontifical, and my comments in "Permission given to priest to run for political office", 2007 CLSA Advisory Opinions 60-62.

Update 5 May 2008: A thoughtful look at the issues from NCReps' John Allen.

Wednesday, April 23, 2008

After decades of disinterest, suddenly two Canon 1405 cases?

POST ONE: Pope Benedict XVI is believed to be mulling over the possibility of expelling a bishop, Fernando Lugo, from the clerical state. That would certainly be a first under the 1983 Code (the Jacques Gaillot case in 1995 was not a precedent; Gaillot was removed from office, but not from the clerical state), and I'm pretty sure it never happened under the 1917 Code.

Lugo, though suspended and removed from ecclesiastical office, remains a cleric, but his election under a reformist banner to Paraguay's presidency upped the ante. Clergy are forbidden to assume civil governing offices (see 1983 CIC 285.3 and my negative conclusions about "Permission given to priest to run for political office", 2007 CLSA Advisory Opinions 60-62) and bishops in political office are at odds with, oh, about a dozen other norms.

Canon 290,3 says that removal from the clerical state can be granted (or imposed, if it comes to that) on deacons for "grave cause" or presbyters for "most grave cause". But the canon doesn't even mention dismissal of a bishop from the clerical state. It's as if no one could imagine it ever happening.

Lugo has reportedly offered to "resign" but it is unclear exactly what he meant by that, or he could face a penal process with the pope as judge per 1983 CIC 1405, 1. Ironically the pope could hear this matter as a case of judging "those who hold the highest civil office of a state" or he could hear it as a case of judging "bishops in penal matters." But regardless of which kind of case he considers, removal of a bishop from the clerical state, and not just from office, is an extremely serious action, something that hasn't happened for centuries.

Okay, so, maybe it's time it did.

Update, same day: A number of readers have asked about the import of the letter of Giovanni Battista Re asserting, among other things, that the removal of a bishop from the clerical state is impossible. This letter, standing alone, is insufficient to prove that point, however, if only because it was written in response to Bp. Lugo's petition for voluntary removal from the clerical state; Re's letter would not preclude the pope from imposing dismissal, in poena or otherwise.

As for folks confusing the clerical state, which can be lost, with the indelible character of holy orders, which can't be lost, consulite auctores probatos.

Hey, who wants to see a concise video report on this case that gets almost every technical term correct? Check out http://www.h2onews.org/_page_videoview.php?id_news=609&lang=en.

+++

POST TWO: How utterly ironic.

I had intended the above title, about the "two Canon 1405 cases" to refer to two possible applications of Canon 1405 in the one case of Bp. Fernando Lugo. But now I see another news item that would involve, of all things, Canon 1405 for a second, completely separate, time.

I refer to Richard Sipe's denunciation of, among others, Theodore Cdl. McCarrick (ret. Washington) on the grounds of sexual misconduct. I know next to nothing about Sipe, but his statement leaves little room for nuance: "I know the names of at least four priests who have had sexual encounters with Cardinal McCarrick. I have documents and letters that record the first hand testimony and eye witness accounts of McCarrick, then archbishop of Newark, New Jersey actually having sex with a priest, and at other times subjecting a priest to unwanted sexual advances."

The same Canon 1405 I referenced above reserves solely to the Roman Pontiff the right to judge all cases involving cardinals and, in penal matters, bishops. Under either heading, let alone both, the only person authorized to investigate, and if warranted judge, Sipe's allegations, is the pope. No ecclesiastical authority may move on this matter without the consent of the Roman Pontiff.

I do think, however, that in conscience, (though not by canon law given the abrogation of 1917 CIC 1935.2), Sipe is bound to send to the Holy See all the information he has about these matters, and not wait to be asked for it.

Sunday, April 13, 2008

My parents' gift to my children

Yesterday my children received a very unusual gift: their grandparents (on my wife's side) celebrated 50 years of marriage. Two years ago, my own parents marked their 50th wedding anniversary, meaning that my kids can now boast something very few in their generation will ever know: the good fortune having both sets of grandparents married for over 50 years.

Grandparental death or divorce deprive most children today of seeing Golden Anniversaries celebrated in their families, that is, of knowing two people who made it through five decades together. My kids now know two couples who did so.

Neither my parents nor Ang's would claim that every day was wine and roses, or that they never faced difficulties, or that they never wondered at times how they'd get through even one more day. But that's precisely the key to understanding the example, the legacy, they have left us: They've showed us that things don't have to be perfect to be good. Very good.

For the goodness that Nade & Nancy and Anthony & Joan have shown my children, I am grateful. And I can't help noticing that, in celebrating their lifes together, they couldn't help giving us all something to celebrate as well. Why?

Because that's the way real Love is. It just can't help sharing.

Thursday, April 10, 2008

Screamingly bad Latin, not to mention bad reporting, from The VOA

The Voice of America boasts of being "A trusted source of news and information since 1942". Oh, really?

VOA's Jeff Swicord drew an admittedly crummy assignment: reporting on the latest shenanigans put on by the "woman priest" crowd. But what should have been a routine serving of empty drivel went l.o.l. funny when Swicord attributed to an Opus Dei priest the following comment on the maleness and the priesthood: "'The church teaches that he [the priest] does this in what is called insomnia nomini Christa, that he does this in the name and the person of Jesus,' says [Fr. Arne] Panula. Jesus was male."

A priest acts "insomnia nomini Christa"? That is screamingly funny. It doesn't mean a thing, folks. The closest I can get is "lack of sleep to/for the name Christina".

But apparently it's not just Opus Dei priests who don't know Latin, it's lady priestettes too: Writes Swicord: "Meehan disagrees. 'A priest is suppose to be in personi Christa,' she says. 'That does not mean taking on male identity.'"

Okay, maybe Father Bridget Mary meant to say "in gobbledy-gook Christina" but I'll bet she didn't; she knows the Latin phrase here is "in persona Christi", which correctly translates as "in the person of Christ."

Maybe Swicord never heard the phrase before (making one wonder how he was assigned to this story in the first place). But since when are reporters, after hearing a technical expression from two interviewees, allowed to simply guess at its spelling? And then to guess it into oblivion? Sheesh.

Now do you see why we never tire of telling Catholics, and the world, that the secular press is laughably incompetent at religious news reporting?

+++

According to the standards above, don't be surprised if the VOA reports the Marine motto "Semper fidelis" to be "Simper fiddles", or if the US Seal "E pluribus unum" comes out "Deploribus moon'em", or if the Olympic motto "Citius, Altius, Fortius" comes out "Citrus, insomnia, forceps."

Thursday, March 27, 2008

Proposal: Impose excommunication for euthanasia

For some months I have been researching and writing an article on euthanasia in canon law. I hoped against hope that it might remain an academic exercise, but (to judge from, say, this report on the practice of euthanasia in Belgium) the speed with which the Western, specifically Christian, protection of innocent life is collapsing suggests that one of my projected canonical recommendations deserves an earlier hearing than appearance in a peer-reviewed journal can afford.

Simply put, I recommend that euthanasia be made an excommunicable offense under the 1983 Code of Canon Law.

Briefly, my article will demonstrate, among other things, the following points:

1. Euthanasia, correctly understood, is unquestionably repudiated by the Catholic moral tradition (CCC 2324 and 2377) and is regarded by the canonical scholarly tradition as a species of homicide.

2. Canon 1397, which subjects those committing "homicide" to "a just penalty", can be invoked against euthanasia, but both the definition of the delict and the scope of the penalty require specific elaboration for each particular case.

3. The contrast between the canonical treatment of abortion (which is explicitly condemned and made punishable by excommunication under 1983 CIC 1398) and that accorded euthanasia (only implicitly condemned and punishable but indeterminately), can no longer be supported: the same factors that lead to the canonical criminalization of abortion (namely, widespread abandonment by states of their duty to protect innocent human life before birth which occured in the 1970s and 1980s, when the new penal canons were being formulated) are presently underway in regard to innocent human life at other stages. The Church therefore must proclaim and, within the limits of her authority, must protect what the State has forgotten and repudiated, namely, the inherent value of innocent human life regardless of age.

4. Eastern canon law already expressly makes homicide an excommunicable offense (CCEO 1450.1). Besides showing that the excommunication of murderers is plausible, this canon suggests that Western Christians (among whom euthanasia is more widespread) should not be treated more leniently than their Eastern brethren for the same offense.

Note that Eastern canon law has done away with latae sententiae (automatic) sanctions (CCEO 1402). I completely agree with this trend, and recommend that the excommunication propsoed for euthanasia under western law be imposable only ferendae sententiae, that is, by a formal process only (1983 CIC 1314, 1342, and 1425).

Excommunication is the gravest sanction in Church's legal system. It is reserved for the most grievous offenses, but especially, I suggest, for those wherein the aid of the state in upholding important values cannot, for whatever reason, be secured. Euthanasia in every way fits the description of an offense that warrants excommunication, and Eastern Catholics already face excommunication for it. It's time Western Catholics were treated with the same kind of tough-love, and time once again that Church law, as it has done so often in the past, show state law what's really important. +++

Read more about it: Edward Peters, Excommunciation and the Catholic Church (2006) esp. pp. 33-35; Interview with Dr. Peters on excommunication by Carl Olson (November 2006); E. Peters, "Church law and euthansia: time to oil a rusty canon?" Lay Witness (Jan-Feb 1997) 13, 27; and E. Peters, "Excommunication: wave of the future?" National Catholic Register (July 1996) 6.

Wednesday, March 26, 2008

Steven Sueppel should not be granted an ecclesiastical funeral

One of the reasons we have rules is to help us guide our decision-making when circumstances make it difficult to think clearly. The horrific murder of the Sueppel family by their husband-father Steven, who then finally succeeded in killing himself, is nothing if not a difficult circumstance. My read, in any case, of 1983 CIC 1184.1.3, in light of the gruesome facts of this case, leads me to conclude that Steven Sueppel should be denied ecclesiastical funeral rites.

Assuming the accuracy of the press reports, there is no doubt that Steven Sueppel offered no "sign of repentance" (as opposed perhaps to expressing some regrets in a note) for having just murdered, barbarically, his wife and four young children. There is no doubt whatsoever that Steven Sueppel offered no "sign of repentance" before killing himself (on the third try). Because Canon 1184 does not require us 'to read the soul' of someone, but instead focuses our attention on observable actions, there is, in my opinion, no doubt but that Steven Sueppel's actions qualify him as "a manifest sinner" who in turn "cannot be granted [an] ecclesiastical funeral without scandal for the faithful."

It is common place to observe that the 1983 Code no longer automatically denies ecclesiastical funerals to those who commit suicide (See, e.g., Cox & Griffin, "Canon 1184", 1997 Roman Replies & CLSA Advisory Opinions at 85-86, and 1917 CIC 1240.1.3); this approach makes good sense, for suicide typically seems to involve some form of grave mental or emotional deficit which can be seen as mitigating the culpability one might otherwise incur for murdering oneself.

But murder-suicide, indeed as here, mass murder-suicide, seems different to me. On the last day of this life, the embezzler Steven Sueppel became a mass murderer. If such behavior is not "manifest sin", what behavior would be?

We can, and should, pray for Steven Sueppel; indeed, Mass can be offered for him (1983 CIC 901). But he should not be accorded the Church's final liturgical and sacramental commendations; not, I think, if the canons on ecclesiastical funerals mean anything close to what they seem to say. +++

1. Read an extended study of Canon 1184 by Dr. Peters. 2. Who is the final authority over the funeral question? The ordinary of the diocese concerned (1983 CIC 1184.2). Could one reach a conclusion different from mine? Sure, but on the facts as known by me, I would have to disagree.

Update: Erin Jordan, "Faithful question church funeral for killer", Des Moines Register (5 May 2008).

Monday, March 24, 2008

Canon 277: "celibacy" and "continence" are different things

The sad case of Zimbabwe Archbishop Pius Ncube, who was the only credible opponent of Thug-in-Chief Robert Mugabe, is the occasion to try to remind people that Canon 277 of the Johanno-Pauline Code establishes two related but distinct obligations for clerics in the Western Church, namely, celibacy and continence. As an archbishop, Ncube was bound both to refrain marriage (celibacy) and to refrain from sexual relations with anyone (continence). Ncube has admitted to having sex with a woman (a married woman, as it happens); therefore he has admitted to violating the law of continence; he has not attempted marriage with this woman, and therefore he has not violated his promise of celibacy.

Nevertheless, every single press report I have seen on this case alleges that Ncube violated his promise of celibacy! Not one of them claims he violated the law of continence. This is the opposite of what they should be saying.

Sunday, March 16, 2008

Consider Latin as an avocation, if not a career. Really.

This from Tore Janson, A Natural History of Latin (Oxford, 2004) at 122: "Thanks to the work of many generations of paleographers and textual critics we now have all the ancient texts in printed editions which are both easy to read and more correct than any of the surviving manuscripts. This is not, however, the case with texts from the Middle Ages, since there are many more of them [i.e., 100,000s] and they have attracted much less interest from Latin specialists. Many of them, even ones that are well worth reading, have been published using only one manuscript that happened to be to hand, even though much better manuscripts may exist. Many more texts have not been published at all, but are waiting in libraries for someone to read them and prepare an edition. There is a limitless amount of valuable work waiting to be done by those who would like to devote themselves to Latin and the Middle Ages."

Think about it. +++

Read more about it: Dr. Peters' Ecclesiastical Latin pages

Friday, March 14, 2008

Abp. Burke's excommunication of the "women priests"

I would like to say that Abp. Raymond Burke's excommunication of three women who recently participated in a pseudo-ordination in Saint Louis is a "text-book illustration" of how (non-judicial) excommunication is supposed to be applied in the Church today, but I can't say that: Why not? Because Abp. Burke's attention to juridic details and his provisions for the pastoral care of the people entrusted to his care so exceed what the textbooks teach, that it is the textbooks that must copy from him, not him from the textbooks.

The four-page decree of excommunication deserves to be read in its entirety, but I'll summarize the sanctions themselves, for they are quite interesting.

1. All three women (Fresen, Hudson, & McGrath) are declared to have incurred latae sententiae (automatic) excommunication under Canon 1364.1 for schism. The consequences of excommunication are set out in Canon 1331.2.

2. All three women are also declared to have incurred ferendae sententiae (formally imposed) interdict under Canon 1371.1 for pertinaciously rejecting a definitive truth of the Faith (namely, that women cannot be ordained priests) subsequent to a specific warning to avoid such conduct. The consequences of interdict are set out in Canon 1332.

3. One of the women (Fresen) is declared to have incurred ferendae sententiae excommunication under Canon 1379 for simulating a sacrament other than the Eucharist or confession (here, holy orders). The consequences of excommunication are set out in Canon 1331.2.

Some observations:

A) Burke avoided a one-penalty-fits-all-crimes approach; different offenses (schism, pertinacious rejection, and simulation) were punished differently (excommunication, interdict, and excommunication respectively). His hands were basically tied in regard to the penalty for schism, but for pertinacious rejection he chose a sanction less severe than excommunication, namely interdict; he went back to excommunication, however, on Fresen for simulation, I'm thinking because she pretended to be a bishop conferring holy orders instead of, say, pretending to be a priest conferring anointing of the sick.

B) Each of the women is free to repent without the cooperation of the others; indeed it even seems possible, however unlikely, for them to repent of just one or two of the crimes and be reconciled in regard to that/them only. How so? Well, for example, Fresen could say "I still believe that woman can be ordained, but I sincerely regret taking the issue into my own hands and conferring what I think are holy orders, and I promise not to do it ever again." She would have a good chance of being reconciled at least on that charge, I would think.

C) If the women take recourse against the penalties (my guess is they will, as others have done before them) the enforcement of the sanctions will be suspended per Canon 1353. I personally think this is an overly generous provision of canon law (indeed, an innovation over 1917 CIC 2243.1) in regard to those who have already been found guilty of grave crimes, but Abp. Burke would certainly honor it.

D) While Abp. Burke's specific notification not to distribute Holy Communion to the three women was only published in Saint Louis (the limits of his jurisdiction), it applies throughout the world to anyone who comes into knowledge of the excommunications and interdict. Canon 915.

Burke's action also indicates, by the way, where he stands on an interesting canonical dispute, namely, whether canons that authorize "a just penalty" (e.g., cc. 1371 and 1379) can be enforced by censure (e.g., excommunication). I've always held that they could. Nice to know I'm in good company.

I need hardly add that the faithful may, and in charity should, join Abp. Burke in praying for the reconciliation of all three women. Might I suggest, in that vein, seeking the intercession of St. Hippolytus, the some-time antipope who later reconciled with the Church and died a martyr's death for her about 235. Miracles happen. +++

Read more about it: Excommunication and the Catholic Church (Ascension 2006)
See also Dr. Peters' Excommunication Blotter

A few other points.

1. Abp. Burke's line about "any of the Sacraments attempted to be celebrated by [these women] are utterly null and void" should be understood as applying to sacraments whose celebration is reserved to the priesthood which these women wrongly claim to possess; as these women are still lay persons, of course, they could still, strictly speaking, validly perform baptism, and for that matter enter marriage, albeit gravely illicitly.

2. The use Abp. Burke made of Canon 747.2 I thought was very insightful. That provision is usually understood to be oriented ad extra as a defense of the Church's right to speak out on social affairs. Abp. Burke's invocation of it in this case reminds us that Church leadership must also look to their own houses and not neglect their charges to comment on others'. Part of Abp. Burke's credibility when he speaks on social issues arises, I think, precisely from his willingness to make hard decisions within his own community.

Wednesday, March 12, 2008

Letter to the Ottawa Citizen re Abp. Prendergast

Newspapers can't run every letter to the editor they get, but thanks to the internet, rejected missives have a second chance to see the light of day.

On Saturday, March 8, 2008, the Ottawa Citizen ran a story about Abp. Terrence Prendergast's statement concering pro-abortion politicians and reception of the Eucharist. As is typical of the secular press, however, the newspaper gave nearly as much time to the negative opinions of one Rosemary Ganley, coordinator of Canada's Catholics for a Free Choice, as if this lady knew enough about Church law and moral theology even to have an opinions worth pitting against those of the archbishop. Pace 1983 CIC 212.3.

Anyway, I sent a letter to the editor of the Ottawa Citizen and, three days having passed without its appearing it seems, I imagine it was not chosen for publication. Whatever. For those who might like to see it, I post it below.

Dear Editor:

Rosemary Ganley's ignorance of canon law seems no obstacle to her lecturing Ottawa's Archbishop Terrence Prendergast on it. No sooner does Abp. Prendergast announce, in some of the most measured language imaginable, that Catholic politicians who support abortion must be aware of the canonical consequences for their contrarian behavior, than does Ganley pronounce the prelate "to be on very shaky ground," allegedly because "There's nothing in [canon law] saying he could deny communion to people who are pro-choice."

Ms. Ganley is wrong.

Canon 915 states that Catholics who "obstinately persevere in manifest grave sin are not to be admitted to holy communion." Abp. Prendergast's statement shows that he is quite familiar not only with this canon, but with Church teaching on the inviolability of innocent human life and the responsibility of governments to protect the weak. Abp. Prendergast is simply moving to apply Church law in defense of principles that the Church proclaims.

Ms. Ganley's shallow claim that canonical consequences should only arise for things expressly reprobated in the Code of Canon Law cannot be taken seriously. Consider: selling drugs, running prostitution rings, or distributing pornography are not expressly scored in the Code, but I doubt that Ms. Ganley would come rushing to the defense of any Catholics excluded from holy Communion for publicly engaging in or advocating such activities.

That's because Ms. Ganley does not really care what canon law says about most things, she cares about promoting abortion. Unfortunately, she also knows that her views on abortion will garner at least as much attention as will those of a man whose education and office make him immeasurably more knowledgeable about Church teaching than Ganley will ever be, so she has little incentive to educate herself.

Edward N. Peters, JD, JCD
Detroit, MI, USA

Canonical conundrum 1

I thought I might, from time to time, post some interesting (well, to me anyway) hypothetical questions against which folks could test their canonical acumen.

FACTS: A Roman Catholic man wants to present himself for ordination to the permanent diaconate. He tells you that many years ago, he civilly married a divorced woman. They remained together for some years until she died of natural causes. He has not remarried, in the Church or out, since. He asks whether, in respect of his marital status, he is eligible for the permanent diaconate.

Q. 1. Do you need additional information to answer his immediate question?

Q. 2. If you do not need additional information, is he eligible for orders?

Q. 3. If he is not eligible, what option(s), if any, might he have to address that fact?

No hints, so don't ask. Answer in about a week. Good luck!

+++

R. 1. Lawyers are generally happy to have more information on cases, but here, everything one needs to know in order to respond accurately to the question has been presented.

R. 2. As things stand now, this man is ineligible for holy orders, including the permanent diaconate. Although not every invalid attempt at marriage renders a man "irregular" for orders under 1983 CIC 1041.4, an attempt at marriage (even a civil marriage, which is why one does not need to know whether the wedding was in the Church) with a woman who is already married validly renders the man "irregular" for orders. It does not matter that the wife is now dead; it is this kind of attempt at marriage that triggers an impediment, not the state.

R. 3. There is something the man could try. Notice that the irregularity for orders arises only if, inter alia, the woman is in a valid marriage. So, how does one try the validity of a marriage after the death of either spouse? One has resort to 1983 CIC 1675.1 which provides for the impugnment of marriage after the death of either (or both, for that matter) spouse if the question of its validity is important for the resolution of another controversy. Such is obviously the case here with regard to the man's eligibility for holy orders, and either the man or the promoter of justice could present the libellus (1983 CIC 1674). Naturally, all the requirements of law would still have to be met in adjudicating the case, but it could be filed.

As I have said many times before, the answer to a canonical question is seldom found within a single canon. Thus, it pays to know the whole Code.

Thursday, March 06, 2008

Repairing Fr. Bozek's sacramental blunders

Abp. Burke, once again, is showing us all how it's supposed to be done.

In a remarkable gesture of pastoral concern for his people, St. Louis Abp. Raymond Burke, who for some three years has been trying to effect the reconciliation of a renegade Polish priest named Fr. Marek Bozek, has alerted the faithful who might be approaching Fr. Bozek for sacramental services, that any attempts by Fr. Bozek to celebrate the sacraments of Confession (1983 CIC 966) or Confirmation (1983 CIC 882-883), or to witness the weddings of Catholics bound by form (1983 CIC 1108), are invalid, and that such Catholics may contact his office directly for assistance in securing these sacraments validly and licitly.

I'll be discussing Fr. Bozek's situation, who as of today is officially careening toward dismissal from the clerical state, with Al Kresta today, starting about 4:20 pm Eastern, on WDEO AM 990 in Detroit / Ann Arbor, or listen live here. Related posts: 20 December 2005; Blog Archives 2006, scroll to December 26; Te Deum Laudamus, 19 March 2008.

Tuesday, March 04, 2008

Seton Hospital must vigorously resist mutilation surgery

Seton Hospital in Daly City CA, administered by the Daughters of Charity, is being intimidated into performing immoral surgery. This Catholic hospital, in the face of civil litigation, appears to have backed down from its originally correct refusal to allow "breast-implant" surgery to be performed on a male. It must now, upon deeper reflection, reverse its faulty decision and refuse the surgery.

Catholic moral teaching generally condemns mutilation where it is intentionally performed against otherwise healthy body parts. CCC 2297, J. Lynch, "Mutilation", New Catholic Encyclopedia 10: 145-146 (1967), and P. Palazzini, "Mutilatio", Dictionarium Morale et Canonicum III: 334-335 (1966).

Canon law makes it a crime for Catholics to commit mutilation. 1983 CIC 1397. See also 1983 CIC 1041, n. 5. Accomplices to canonical crime are liable to punishment under 1983 CIC 1329.

In my opinion, "breast-implant" surgery performed on one born a male constitutes mutilation. If my opinion is correct (and it is, but others will want to verity that for themselves) Seton Hospital should vigorously defend against its being forced to perform or facilitate this immoral surgery. Free exercise and freedom of conscience arguments seem applicable here.

Related post: Ashley's treatment was a travesty (5 Jan 2007).

Monday, March 03, 2008

Asserting a canonical defense is one thing; proving it another

Dennis Riccitelli, a priest* from Arizona, is facing state prosecution for alleged theft and/or fraud against his former parish, Holy Cross (Mesa). But Riccitelli is trying to raise canon law (specifically, norms on the administration of ecclesiastical property) as a defense to his state prosecution. His canonical argument got the trial judge's attention, as it should. It also has prosecutors worried; but it shouldn't.

Riccitelli's case might not be an ideal one through which to encourage, even on a small scale, civil law to recognize, where appropriate, the relevance of canon law in American law and society, but it's preferable, I think, to its serving as an occasion to repudiate entirely civil consideration of canonical arguments. With all the usual caveats about commenting on stories reported in the secular press, let's see why.

Defendants in state criminal cases sometimes raise what are called "affirmative defenses", that is, arguments that their conduct, though apparently in violation of criminal law, was justified by something not mentioned in the law. A common example would be that a speeding ticket should be dismissed because a father was rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. There is no "pregnant wife" exception in the motor vehicle code, but a defendant would probably be allowed to offer those facts as an affirmative defense (here, "necessity") to avoid a speeding conviction. A judge/jury might or might not accept the argument (the burden usually lies on the defendant to prove affirmative defenses), but generally a defendant is allowed to raise it.

Similarly, an officer of XYZ Corp who makes expenditures that appear to be in violation of, say, state laws about fiduciary duties to the corporation, could argue that, under the by-laws of XYZ corporation, such odd expenditures were in fact permitted. Again, he might fail to prove his claim, but it's a plausible defense and generally should be heard. So in this case, Riccitelli is claiming that canon law authorized him as then-pastor to spend parish money in ways that appear to prosecutors (and to the Diocese of Phoenix, for that matter) to be criminal.

It seems to me that Riccitelli should be allowed to raise canon law as a possible defense, for indeed, he was supposed to be administering parish property in accord with canon law (1983 CIC 532). For a judge to allow a canonical affirmative defense is clearly not tantamount to opening the door to prosecuting people for violating canon law or sharia or anything else; Riccitelli is being charged with violating Arizona law, not canon law. The judge, Hon. Silvia Arellano, seems to understand this, as do the appellate courts of Arizona.

At the same time, though, if the facts alleged in the media are borne out, prosecutor Barnett Lotstein probably has little to fear from this defense: no matter what Riccitelli might claim, canon law does not allow pastors to treat parish assets as their own property (1983 CIC 1256, 1281-1289) nor to enrich themselves at parochial expense. Canons 282 and 285-286 instruct clerics to shun ostentatious lifestyles and to avoid engaging in personal business transactions without the permission of the ordinary. And Canon 1344, n. 2, takes for granted that some canonical crimes are also civil crimes for which offenders might be prosecuted and punished by the state. In short, my guess is that a canonical expert would have an easy time refuting Riccitelli's apparent claim that canon law let him spend parish money any way he wanted, leaving a state prosecution of Riccitelli to stand or fall on the merits of the case. Plus, the possibility of examining canonical issues in other state cases where it might be relevant, nay possibly vital, would be neatly served.

The respect that canon law accords civil law (e.g., 1983 CIC 22) should be reciprocated. I am aware of the pitfalls awaiting those who venture the path between Church and State, but history has shown the passage to be possible. When properly followed, it can be of great benefit to the subjects of both legal systems.

*Some media sources describe Riccitelli as a "former pastor" others as a "former priest". Riccitelli's canonical status is not relevant to this topic of this post.

Friday, February 29, 2008

The rules on baptism are meant to be followed

When, back on 2 December 2004, I blogged about "Brisbane's Bad Baptisms", I got an unusual number of nasty notes from folks who (assuming they agreed with my point that baptism in the name of the Creator, and of the Redeemer, and of the Sanctifier was invalid, and many did not agree), nevertheless took umbrage at my conclusion that those undergoing such rituals were not, in fact, any kind of Christian (pace the archbishop there), and that such persons, to be Christian, let alone Catholic, needed to be absolutely (not conditionally, pace 1983 CIC 869.1) baptized anew. "It wasn't their fault they were baptized invalidly," wrote one unhappy reader, "how can you deny them the grace of God because of something they didn't do?" Like, you know, I decide who gets God's grace and who doesn't.

Today, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith announced its ruling that any 'baptism' attempted "in the name of the Creator, and of the Redeemer, and of the Sanctifier" (or, to take another silly variation, "in the name of the Creator, and of the Liberator, and of the Sustainer") is invalid, and that persons who received such 'baptisms' . . . "have, in reality, not been baptised [and must] . . . be treated for all canonical and pastoral purposes with the same juridical criteria as people whom the Code of Canon Law places in the general category of non-baptised."

I won't say that it feels good being shown right by an "authentic doctrinal declaration" from CDF, but it sure beats being shown wrong.

Anyway, sacraments are pretty tough things, designed by Christ to be administered even by fallen people. But sacraments have rules, instilled by the Lord, that must be followed. When his rules aren't followed, real people miss out. So let's get these folks baptized as Christ directed, and get back about the task of spreading his Good News as Jesus would have it spread.

Update: 07 March 2008. Neil Hickey's on-line article about this topic for couriermail.com.au is full of errors, some of which appear attributable to Brisbane Chancellor Fr. Jim Spence. First, these baptisms were not just "illicit" or "illegitimate", they were invalid; second, that means these baptisms did not happen; third invalid baptism renders null any subsequent attempt to receive a sacrament. How these repeated errors can still be in circulation utterly escapes me.

Thursday, February 28, 2008

What's with all this "defrocking" lingo?

Suddenly, it seems, "defrock" is the in-word.

Karoun Demirjian writes that the Rev. Donald Maguire, sj, has been "defrocked" by the Vatican. Jeannette Cooper writes that Fr. Marek Bozek faces "defrocking" for disobedience to Abp. Raymond Burke. Erin Jordan writes that the bishop of Davenport wants to "defrock" Fr. Gerald Stouvenel. What with all this "defrocking" going on, one might even start to think that the word means something. Well, it doesn't; at least, it sure doesn't mean what these journalists think it means.

Notwithstanding that it can be found in some secular dictionaries to describe removing an ordained man from the clerical state, the word "defrock" is not correct usage in Catholic circles; Catholic writers, if no else, should know that.

Under the Pio-Benedictine Code there was a penalty called "deprivation of ecclesiastical habit" that could be imposed on a cleric and which, besides prohibiting him from dressing as a cleric, could also cost him certain other clerical rights (1917 CIC 2298). But this penalty, sometimes loosely called "defrocking", was distinct from, and obviously less serious than, dismissal from the clerical state (technically known in those days as "degradation"). And dismissal, I assume, is what these journalists think they are discussing, no?

In their English-language dictionaries of canon law, Taunton (1905), Trudel (1919), and Lydon (1934) did not use the word "defrock" even to describe deprivation of clerical garb, let alone to mean dismissal from the clerical state, nor is "defrock" used in either sense by the Catholic Encyclopedia (1912-1917) or the New Catholic Encyclopedia (1967). Indeed the only Catholic encyclopedia I know of that has an entry for "Defrocking" is the excellent one published by Our Sunday Visitor (1991, 1998) wherein the word is scored as "a common but incorrect term that often refers to the reduction of a cleric to the lay state."

Since the advent of the Johanno-Pauline Code in 1983, the correct phrase to denote the most severe expiatory penalty the Church can impose on a deacon, priest, or bishop is "dismissal from the clerical state" (1983 CIC 1336.1, n. 5). Even the term "laicization", used for a while after Vatican II to soften the harsh rendering of Latin's degradatio as "degradation", is generally avoided today as it seems to imply that the lay state itself is some sort of punishment.

In short, enough with this "defrocking" lingo. These men are facing, or have already undergone, dismissal from the clerical state. Catholics know what that means.

Read more about it: There is a good dissertation on this topic, Joseph Shields, Deprivation of the Clerical Garb, Canon Law Studies No. 334, (Catholic University of America, 1958) that will help one sort out, say, temporary versus permanent deprivation of clerical garb, and how both sanctions were assumed, or not, in various related clergy penalties such as "deposition" and "degradation".

And this I have to see: "Le defroque" (Joannon, 1954). (Thanks to a long-time Canon Law Blog reader!)

Tuesday, February 26, 2008

Feuerherd's curse cannot be ignored

To wish damnation on an individual or a group is to wish on them the absolutely worst fate conceivable: separation from God forever. CCC 1035. Catholics possessed of even a rudimentary catechesis know that one cannot invoke upon a human being any greater calamity than damnation, and that it is never licit, for any reason, to wish that another person be damned.

On February 24, National Catholic Reporter correspondent Joe Feuerherd, writing in the Washington Post, expressed his desire to see the bishops (of the United States) literally damned before he would fail to vote Democratic this Fall.

Feuerherd's words of contempt were not shouted in a heated argument wherein, say, a lack of time for reflection or "anger hormones" might mitigate one's culpability for uttering invectives. No, Feuerherd's curse, "the bishops be damned", was expressed in cold, deliberate, prose intended for maximum effect in a prominent national publication.

Now, Canon 1369 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law states that "a person who . . . in published writing . . . expresses insults or excites hatred or contempt against religion or the Church is to be punished with a just penalty." Canon 1373 states that "a person who publicly incites among subjects animosities or hatred against the Apostolic See or an ordinary because of some act of power or ecclesiastical ministry . . . is to be punished by an interdict or other just penalties."

I believe Feuerherd has gravely violated both of these canons.

The penalties for violating either canon are preceptive (puniatur); Feuerherd's public expression of contempt for the souls of the bishops occurred in the Archdiocese of Washington, although other venues afford jurisdiction for the case (CIC 1408, 1412); and every potential penal case begins with preliminary investigation (CIC 1717). However much American bishops as individuals might willing to forgive Feuerherd on a personal level, they must also assess this terrible incident as Successors of the Apostles, that is, as men entrusted with a precious and holy office not of their making, but in their care.

I hope these matters will be considered with alacrity; in the meantime, we can pray that Feuerherd retracts the surpassing invective which he has directed toward the bishops of America.

Updates: Catholic News Agency, 27 Feb 2008; USCCB's Sr. Mary Ann Walsh, 27 Feb 2008;

Friday, February 01, 2008

Caveat lector: Fr. Maciel was not "suspended"

The death of Fr. Marcial Maciel Degollado occasions revisiting the numerous accusations of sexual misconduct made against founder of the Legionaries of Christ over the years. These accusations culminated in a 2006 investigation by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, which dicastery declined, however, to subject the elderly Maciel to a canonical trial and instead decided "to invite [Maciel] to a reserved life of prayer and penance, renouncing every public ministry." The analysis I offered at the time of that unusual directive from CDF still stands.

Precisely in light of that analysis, I would caution against describing Maciel having been "suspended" or "penalized" by the Holy See. Under canon law, and in contrast with civil usage, suspension is a penalty imposed on those found guilty of certain crimes (1983 CIC 221, 1319, 1333, 1400-1401). Make of CDF's directive what one will, but Maciel was not tried and was not found guilty of any crimes; it is, therefore, not accurate to describe him as "suspended" or "penalized".

Wednesday, January 30, 2008

Brazilian excommunication warning

LifeSite News reports that: "Brazilian Archbishop Jose Cardoso Sobrinho has condemned a plan by Recife city officials to distribute the morning-after pill during the upcoming Carnival festival and has warned that those who use the pill are subject to excommunication. 'This policy is wicked and immoral, and in this case, both those who use it and those who incite its use are committing a crime punishable by excommunication,' Archbishop Cardoso said."

The city policy is, in my opinion, unquestionably wicked and immoral (CCC 1910, 2273, 2377). But whether those who use, or incite the use of, this pill are committing an excommunicable offense depends on, among other things (e.g., 1983 CIC 1323-1324, 1329), whether an abortion is actually procured thereby (1983 CIC 1398).

If the 'morning after pill' works by preventing ovulation, it is contraceptive; if it works by preventing implantation, it is abortifacient. Only the latter, but certainly the latter, provides a basis in canon law for excommunication. See my blog post "Excommunication for deliberate embryo destruction" (29 June 2006). +++

See also my Excommunication Blotter, updated regularly.

Monday, January 28, 2008

Sports writers: a parallel magisterium?

For many like me, the term "sports writer" conjures up the image of a high school athletics star who, after playing so-so in college and never making it to the pros, parleyed a certain facility with words into getting paid to watch other people (most of whom would never make it to the pros either) play games. What we never realized, it seems, was just how many sports writers apparently spend all their free time studying moral theology, canon law, and the history of religion in public life. Yet, just look at how many sports writers feel qualified to publish opinions applauding the abortionism that St. Louis University basketball Coach Rick Majerus is publicly and defiantly maintaining against his Archbishop Raymond Burke.

But folks, after reading a raft of pep rallies published for Coach Majerus over the weekend, I've reached a conclusion: if sports writers are really qualified to parse Catholic moral theology and ecclesiastical discipline against a world class theologian and canonist like Abp. Burke, then I'm more than qualified to coach college ball. Hey, I've watched some NBA All-Star videos, I saw "Hoosiers" (which, okay, wasn't about college basketball, but so what?),and people still talk about that right hand hook shot I made in the eighth grade basketball camp.

Laugh if you want, but that's about the level of ecclesiastical sophistication that sports writers are bringing to bear against Abp. Burke for his reaction to Majerus' support for abortion and experimentation on embryonic human beings. But let's be very clear about something here: Coach Majerus, not Abp. Burke, violated the wall of separation between Church and Sport, and now it's up to Majerus to repair the damage he did. In the meantime, the more his allies in the sports media try to defend the coach's blunder, the more they show themselves to be way, way out of their league.

One pernicious line being pushed by the sports media machine runs thus: It's unfair to rag on poor Majerus cuz, after all, he's just a hoops coach who was caught off guard with a trick question by the media. That's total baloney. Rick Majerus touts his Catholic education whenever it suits him, and he has dealt with, and even worked for, the media for many years. Though "just a coach", Majerus is probably the highest paid official at St. Louis University (good grief!), and he soon will be, if he is not already, the most nationally recognized name the university has.

If, therefore, anyone at a Jesuit educational institution needs to be called for reiterating public dissent from Church moral teaching, for supporting the canonically criminal acts of abortion and experimentation on embryonic humans, and for stiff-arming an archbishop who has called for a retraction, it's SLU basketball coach Rick Majerus.

Unless, that is, you also think that Abp. Burke is qualified to coach NCAA Men's Division I basketball. You know, just like I am.

+++

Some good sense from CWR's George Neumayr.