To work for the proper implementation of canon law is to play an extraordinarily
constructive role in continuing the redemptive mission of Christ. Pope John Paul II
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5 jan 2013
Responses to Deacon Pilger's comments concerning diaconal continence
This is really two pages, first, my early responses to Dcn. Rex Pilger's critiques of my interpretation of Canon 277 (along with a graphic on the legislative history of Canon 277), and second, a record of two contributions by Fr. Brian Van Hove to this discussion.
In my responses to Pilger, below, I essentially ran down a rabbit trail that, had I it to do over again, I would not have pursued. Basically, the whole of Pilger's argument hinges on his assuming that the word "therefore" (ideoque) means in Canon 277 what it means in formal logic. I missed this assumption on his part, and spent considerable time trying to address his conclusions, when, all along, it was his assumption that I should have addressed. This point dawned on me, eventually, but by then it was lost for practical purposes: the word "therefore" does not necessarily mean in canon law what it means in formal logic, anymore than, say, the word "valid" means in canon law what it means in formal logic. The canonical rules for determining the meaning of words is set out in, firstly, Canon 17, and Pilger needed to prove his claim about what canon law means in accord with the rules that canon law sets out for its own interpretation. Anyway, I did a poor job of flagging his error here.
The materials by Van Hove, though, brief, are useful both for what they say in substance, and, in another regard as well, as follows.
I have been criticized by some for bringing this matter to the blogosphere. Now, prescinding from whether doing such a thing is grounds for criticism in the first place, the simple fact is, I did not bring this matter to the public eye. Others did.
I published my arguments in Studia Canonica, a highly-regarded peer-reviewed journal for professional canonists. It percolated there, for a few years, until Van Hove and Pilger made use of some of its points in their debates on the future of the diaconate. As my own arguments (as opposes to others' characterizations of my arguments) were, for this wider audience, difficult to access, I ask for and received permission to post the original article from Studia, responded to Pilger, whereupon many more people became aware of the serious disconnect between law and tradition on one hand, and modern clerical practice on the other.
16 Dec 2008
Dcn. Pilger indicates that our exchange "does not seem to be fruitful" and has discontinued it. Once again, however, I am sure that he and I agree in asking the intercession of St. Ephraem on those wanting to understand these issues.
5 Dec 2008
As Dcn. Pilger notes, he and I are presently in private discussion about this topic.
30 Nov 2008
Dcn. Pilger posted a number of responses to my comments. In brief, I would say that Pilger concedes one or two minor points, and then rejects (or ignores) my other assertions. I could, of course, and might yet if it appears useful, respond to his recent posts. I would concede one or two points on which I think he is correct, and reject (but hopefully not ignore) most of his other assertions, those on which I think Pilger is wrong. But I hesitate to go that route: such tit-for-tat exchanges are engaging at some level, but they tend to take us further from the central issues.
So, how best to proceed? I think thus: as I was not an original party to the Van Hove / Pilger debate, and as my main contribution to this matter is set forth in some detail in my Studia Canonica article, I think it the better use of my time to limit myself to replying to qualified critiques of points made in that article (say, the legislative history of Canon 277 § 1 set out below, or the failure of Canon 288 to exempt permanent deacons from its obligations), and not try to address every author who wishes to consider this aspect of the diaconate or that in regard to clerical obligations. If for no other reason, my expertise does not extend that far.
I am sure Dcn. Pilger joins me in invoking St. Ephraem's intercession on those grappling with these issues.
For there are men who actually carry out the functions of the deacon's office, either preaching the word of God as catechists, or presiding over scattered Christian communities in the name of the pastor and the bishop, or practicing charity in social or relief work. It is only right to strengthen them by the imposition of hands which has come down from the Apostles, and to bind them more closely to the altar, that they may carry out their ministry more effectively because of the sacramental grace of the diaconate. Ad gentes 16.
NB: One’s having to pray the Office would not necessarily imply being ordained, of course, for the Office obligation could arise in other ways as suggested above.
Edward N. Peters, JD, JCD
(25 October 2008)
The Rev. Brian Van Hove, SJ, and Dcn. Rex Pilger are debating in the Homiletic and Pastoral Review whether the obligation of clerical continence (1983 CIC 277) applies to married permanent deacons (see Notes below). Van Hove argues affirmatively, Pilger negatively. My 2005 article on this question has been cited approvingly by Van Hove, but I have not intervened in the HPR discussion because, until recently, my own work had not been challenged by either side. In the October 2008 issue of HPR, however, and on his personal website, Pilger attempts to refute several points that I made or accept concerning clerical continence.
Responses to Pilger's comments
Pilger 1: “First, a minor detail: ‘Minor Orders’ were suppressed by Paul VI. There are at present only ‘Orders’”.
Response 1: If this is a minor detail, why does Pilger mention it, unless he wants to imply that my use of the term (or Van Hove’s) is passé? In any case, what Pilger dismisses as a “minor detail” surfaces an important issue: It is essential that one be aware of the distinctions between the obligations binding men in “major orders”, in contrast with those binding men in “minor orders”, in order to discuss competently the possibility that obligations long associated with major orders now apply to all men in “holy orders” in the West. I and others argue that, as a matter of law and history, married clerics in major orders were forbidden the use of marriages already contracted, while clerics in minor orders were not so restricted. It would be, therefore, virtually impossible to discuss the situation of men who are in, or who are considering entering, (major) orders today if we pretend that the traditional division of orders into major and minor had no relevance for the current discussion.
Pilger 2: “Consider the logical content of part of canon 277: The obligation of continence implies the obligation of celibacy. An equivalent, complementary, form of this statement is: the non-obligation of celibacy implies the non-obligation of continence.” Pilger's emphasis.
Response 2: Pilger’s errors here are lapidary.
First, it is misleading of Pilger to attempt to rephrase the obligation aspect of c. 277 by using the verb “implies”; I am unaware of any provision in the 1983 Code wherein the verb “to imply” conveys a consequential obligation; certainly, c. 277 does not use the word. Unless Pilger can find some examples of such usage, I must score his eisegetical substitution of an equivocal word into the canon, in order to advance what he purports to be an argument about canonical obligations, when canon law itself does not use such vocabulary to impose obligations.
Second... [A reader tells me that my second reason for rejecting Pilger’s claim is not convincing. I see why the reader says that. In my Follow-up (26 October 2008) below, I clarify my second objection.]
Third, Pilger’s supposedly "equivalent, complementary" recasting of the canon, if such recasting were accurate, would mean that canon law had made a pastorally ridiculous statement. Pilger says that c. 277 can be reformulated as “the non-obligation of celibacy implies the non-obligation of continence.” But that can’t be what canon law would hold, else, my single, teenage sons, who most certainly are not obligated to celibacy, would not be obligated to continence either! Obviously, canon law commits no such blunder; rather, Pilger's manipulated text does.
In the end, Pilger’s attempt at a logician’s argument distracts him from seeing that the obligation of continence, like the obligation of praying the Office, can arise from more than one source. Certainly celibate men are obliged to observe continence (the source of that obligation being natural and divine law, not celibacy per se), but men can also be obligated to continence for reasons besides their not being married. I, Van Hove, and weightier authors besides, argue that the obligation of continence arises with the reception of holy orders per c. 277. Pilger is free to dispute that claim, but he first has to recognize what claim is being made.
Pilger 3: “There is another explanation [for the elimination--which apparently Pilger concedes--from the 1983 Code of an exemption for married deacons from the clerical obligation of continence]; the ‘exemption’ wasn’t necessary: Explicit provision for marital rights in marriage is already existent by virtue of the sacramental marital state (almost a tautology).”
Response 3: I think it careless of Pilger to imply that all married deacons are in “sacramental” marriages, for they certainly need not be. But beyond that, what Pilger thinks is a “tautology” is actually his own petitio principii. He is merely asserting the right of married people to engage in marital relations regardless of the possibility that they might have freely and mutually accepted the obligation of continence consequent to the husband’s reception of holy orders. That, of course, is precisely the point in dispute, and Pilger’s alleged “tautology” masks his avoidance of the central question. The defeat of Pilger’s “tautology” claim leaves him simply conceding that an express continence exemption for married deacons was, as I pointed out in my article, eliminated from c. 277 § 1 by Pope John Paul II (see Notes below).
Pilger 4: “As part of the diaconal ordination rite, only unmarried candidates take a vow [sic] of celibacy; married candidates do not take a corresponding vow [sic] of continence.”
Response 4: Prescinding from Pilger’s confusing of clerical promises with religious vows, it is well known that “assertions from absence” are risky propositions. If this one does anything, however, I think it supports the idea that clerical obligations stated in the law are not usually reiterated in the ordination rite (pace c. 276 § 2, n. 3). Consider: at their ordination diocesan priests do not make, for example, a promise of residing in the diocese or of offering mass for the people entrusted to their care as pastors. Why not? Perhaps because these and many other clerical obligations are already explicitated in the Code (cc. 283 §1 and 534 § 1 respectively). So too, it appears, is the obligation of continence (c. 277).
Finally, Pilger’s (5) discussion of the description of the deacon in the Catechism of the Catholic Church is moderately interesting, but his invocation of Canons 1008 and 1009 is bootless, for neither norm sheds any light on our discussion; moreover, I wonder whether one should assume, as Pilger does, that, if there is a conflict between the Code of Canon Law and the Catechism in a given area (and I don't see much evidence that Pilger is qualified to make such determinations), it must necessarily be the Code that stands in need of correction. It is one thing to hold, as I do, that canon law works in service to doctrine; it is quite another thing to assume that the Catechism, in any given passage, is more accurately phrased than the Code.
I think that the above responses show Pilger's comments to be inadequate rebuttals of the arguments I have set out regarding clerical continence obligations.
Pilger’s interest in diaconal continence might be purely academic, or it might reflect his concerns about the ramifications of Canon 277 being applicable to all clerics for the future of the permanent diaconate or about the expectations for married men (and their wives) who were ordained without adequate knowledge of the obligation of continence. These are reasonable questions for which I and others have proposed, I think, reasonable answers. I urge Pilger and all those interested in these questions not simply to skim a few blog posts or letters to the editor on this matter, but to study carefully the works of those who are analyzing this important question with an openness to following wherever the Truth might lead.
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The basic sequence of the HPR exchange is: Rex Pilger, “Making sense of the ministry of the deacon”, HPR November 2006 pp. 23-27; Brian Van Hove, Letter, HPR April 2007 p. 6; Richard Kosterman, Letter, and Fr. Vincent, Letter, HPR November 2007 pp. 3-4; Brian Van Hove, Letter, HPR March 2008 pp. 6-7; Mark Gross, Letter, HPR July 2008 pp. 5-6; and Rex Pilger, Letter, HPR October 2008 pp. 4-5. For all the letters, see R. Pilgers' Deacon's Bench Weblog of October 2, 2008.
1983 CIC 277. § 1. Clerics are obliged to observe perfect and perpetual continence for the sake of the kingdom of heaven and therefore are bound to celibacy which is a special gift of God by which sacred ministers can adhere more easily to Christ with an undivided heart and are able to dedicate themselves more freely to the service of God and humanity. § 2. Clerics are to behave with due prudence towards persons whose company can endanger their obligation to observe continence or give rise to scandal among the faithful. § 3. The diocesan bishop is competent to establish more specific norms concerning this matter and to pass judgment in particular cases concerning the observance of this obligation.
The textual development of Canon 277 § 1
from E. Peters, Incrementa in Progressu 255
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I had originally (25 October) posed my second objection to Pilger's argument as follows:
Second, at the level of common parlance, Pilger’s argument fails, for his assertion about equivalent negation holds only if the assertion and the allegedly consequent implication to be negated are uniquely and exclusively related to each other. What do I mean?
Well, for example, one could say that being ordained ‘implies’ having the indelible character of orders on one’s soul, and that not being ordained ‘implies’ not having such a character. Though such an assertion would be unremarkable, at least it would be true, because ordination and the character of orders are uniquely and exclusively related. But, to take a different example, could one say that being a deacon ‘implies’ the obligation of praying the Liturgy of the Hours, and that not being a deacon ‘implies’ not having to pray the Divine Office? Of course not, for one might be obligated to pray the Office in virtue of another title, for example, because one is a religious or is under private vow, etc. Because, as I and others have argued, celibacy and continence, like diaconate and the Divine Office, are not uniquely and exclusively related, Pilger’s attempt to restate the meaning of the canon negatively (in order neatly to dispatch with his own reformulation) fails.
Restatement of my objection (26 October):
I think Pilger’s reformulation of Canon 277 is wrong, and that his reformulation in turn yields a wrong principle of interpretation, but I have not clearly explained that above. I’ll try to do so here.
Recall that Pilger wrote: [A] The obligation of continence implies the obligation of celibacy. An equivalent, complementary, form of this statement is: [B] the non-obligation of celibacy implies the non-obligation of continence.
I attempted above to set up a different example using ordination and Divine Office. In doing so, however, I failed to track Pilger’s phrasing; I should have set up my example as (A) being ordained “implies” having to pray the Office; and (B) not having to pray the Office “implies” not being ordained. That phrasing would have followed Pilger's and showed that Pilger and I agree on the formal logic. Instead I arranged my example differently than Pilger did his, critiqued an argument he had not offered, and went immediately to my third objection without showing clearly how I got there. So, I must retrace my steps and try now to address the problem with Pilger’s rephrasing of Canon 277 directly.
So again, look at Pilger’s rephrasing of the canon: “The obligation of continence implies the obligation of celibacy.”
The problem with Pilger’s attempted rephrasing is this: the obligation of continence (which binds all unmarried men and women) simply does not imply the obligation of celibacy. All unmarried persons are obligated to be continent even if most of them recognize that they are not bound to celibacy and are in fact consciously moving toward marriage. What Pilger fails to appreciate is that, in canon law and moral theology, “celibacy” is a willed-state, not a “default” setting or a generic description for the condition of being unmarried. To be “celibate”, in pursuit of holy orders or otherwise (e.g., religious life, apostolic consecration, etc.), means to have promised to remain permanently in the state of not being married, and not simply to have recognized that one happens to be not married at the time, even as an adult.
Because the obligation of continence does not imply the obligation of celibacy, Pilger’s rephrasing of the meaning of Canon 277 to (A) “The obligation of continence implies the obligation of celibacy” is substantively false.
Now, if Pilger’s reformulated statement (A) is substantively false, then his subsequent statement (B) “the non-obligation of celibacy implies the non-obligation of continence”, even if (I say if, because I still dispute Pilger’s use of “implies” for, I presume, the canon's ideoque) it is logically equivalent of his (A), unavoidably yields a substantively false assertion. That was the thrust of my third criticism of Pilger’s reformulation of Canon 277, wherein I pointed out that unmarried persons who indisputably are not bound to celibacy are nevertheless bound to continence. Pilger’s formally sound, but materially false, reformulations of the canon would have unmarried persons who are not bound by celibacy not being bound by continence either. I’m sure Pilger would not advocate that outcome, but his rephrasing of Canon 277 results in that assertion and thus must be rejected as reflecting what the canon is saying.
Van Hove, sj.
Homiletic & Pastoral Review
April 2007, p. 6.
Thank you for publishing the article by Rex H. Pilger, Jr., “The Ministry of the Deacon” (Homiletic and Pastoral Review, (November 2006) on the restored permanent diaconate. However, the author seems unaware of the current lively discussion of 1983 CIC 277 and the formal requirement of continence for all men in Major Orders. There has been confusion and disorder over this since the permanent diaconate was restored, and Deacon Pilger’s essay is incomplete without adverting to that canon in the Code which states that married men in Major Orders are expected to abstain from the 'use of marriage rights' after ordination. Wives have the right to refuse to consent to their husband’s ordination for this precise reason. Readers should consult Edward N. Peters, “Canonical Considerations on Diaconal Continence” published in Studia Canonica 39 (2005) 147-180.
Reverend Brian Van Hove, S. J.
White House Retreat
St. Louis, Missouri
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“Between Quinisext and Canon 277”, by Brian Van Hove, S.J.
A Combined Response to Father Vincent and to Father Kosterman
Letter to the Editor in Homiletic & Pastoral Review, March 2008 , pp. 6-7
The history of the ecclesiastical discipline of continence in the Eastern Churches is this. Until the 692 A.D. Quinisext Council [“In Trullo”], all married clergy in East and West practiced perfect apostolic continence. They completed their families before ordination and lived “as brother and sister in the Lord”.
The Eastern Church’s appeal to Paphnutius was demolished by Alfons Maria Stickler. “Paphnutius” was invented to persuade Council and Emperor to legitimize a return to Levitical or temporary continence for priests and deacons. The Western Church rejected that canon from Quinisext and continued the original apostolic practice. Eventually, the Western Church stopped ordaining married men altogether and ordained only celibate men. This shift made it clearer that the offering of the One Sacrifice in the Person of the Bridegroom is the unsurpassable fulfillment of masculine nuptiality. There is no remainder for a wife, and deacons are required to be celibate because their liturgical office is integrated with that offering.
The Eastern return to the Levitical discipline was never formalized. Orthodox priests and deacons abstain before and after Divine Liturgy “from the one blessing not washed away in the Flood” for one day, three days, seven days and perhaps during all of Great Lent. Temporary continence prevents the Orthodox lower clergy from celebrating “daily Mass” because such frequency would entail de facto perpetual continence. Only the bishop, because he is chosen from the celibate monks, can celebrate “daily Mass”. The Moscow Patriarchate canonized St. John of Kronstadt in 1990. After ordination to the priesthood, the saint announced that he and his matushka were living in continence. By this choice they returned to the practice of the first centuries of the undivided Church.
Some years ago I occasionally visited a Russian Orthodox priest-friend on Saturday evenings. I learned from him that he always camped out on the living room couch because his celebration of the Divine Liturgy was scheduled for the next morning. This is Levitical practice, like Zachariah who lived in the temple during the time of his service. Zachariah and the priests left their wives at home and returned to them after temple duty.
Despite Paul VI’s Sacrum Diaconatus Ordinem (A.A.S. 59  697-704) which presupposes apostolic continence, many on the religious left continued to promote the permanent diaconate as “a wedge in the door” opening to the real agenda: the abolition of mandatory priestly celibacy. Sacred Tradition and the canons of Western councils requiring apostolic continence for married clergy, especially Elvira and Carthage, were ignored. A noncontinent diaconate was to be the “first step”. Some bishops in Europe attempted to ordain married “viri probati” as priests, but Paul VI stopped these efforts.
As Edward N. Peters illustrated visually, the revised draft of Canon 277 for the 1983 CIC contained an exception from continence for permanent deacons. The pope, acting in his office as pope, removed the exception. There are no exceptions written into Canon 277, and commentaries on the law have no canonical standing in the church.
Father Kosterman can obtain a brief of Edward Peters’ analysis of Canon 277 at his website: http://www.canonlaw.info/a_deacons.htm. The analysis is set out fully in Peters’ article “Canonical Considerations on Diaconal Continence” in Studia Canonica 39/1-2 (2005) 147-180. The earlier studies of Alfons Stickler, Roman Cholij and Christian Cochini are essential to our understanding of the tradition of apostolic continence and its relation to the Holy Eucharist. Cochini and Cholij wrote their doctoral dissertations on that subject. Henri Crouzel and Stefan Heid offer yet further documentation.
Given the chaos and incoherencies of East and West, Pope Benedict’s 2005 restriction on second marriages for permanent deacons precisely because it is apostolic tradition, assures a lively future discussion of clerical continence. The sources of the Tradition, especially before the novelty of Quinisext, will not disappear. Can we say that the Holy Spirit did not guide the early church?
Any adequate theology of the nuptial symbolism of the Eucharistic sacrifice cannot conceive of a sacred ministry other than that instituted by our Lord. This ministry is the representation in his Person of the Bridegroom’s sacrificial fidelity to his Bride, a fidelity which is unqualified and unconditioned (I Timothy 3:2).